The Promises and Perils of Quad

Image credits: Warroom, Army War College

A recent article described the Quad as a Potemkin alliance, referring to Russian villages that were created as a façade to impress officials. The author argues that despite its initial promise, the coalition appears to be losing momentum. Due to elections in India and the US, the meeting is now finally slated to take place in the latter half of the year. This prolonged delay has led to a pessimistic outlook about the viability and future of the group. 

After the announcement of the AUKUS in 2021, there was a renewed debate over the relevance of the Quad. The newly formed ‘SQUAD’ (a defense partnership between the US, Japan, Australia and the Phillipines) further raises questions on the Quad agenda and purpose. While the Quad was never conceived as a military alliance, it is often criticised for having a loftier strategic vision than it can tangibly achieve.

It has also been charged with suffering from the drawbacks of mini-laterals, which are voluntary, non-binding and consensus-based. Even though mini-laterals are issue-specific partnerships among states with shared interests and security concerns, (as is the Quad) the national interests and priorities of individual countries might take precedence, resulting in poor execution. 

However, the Quad can be complementary to other mini-laterals like the AUKUS and the SQUAD and not necessarily contradictory to their aims. It enjoys the advantage of being a larger platform focusing on significantly wide-ranging issues (ranging from space co-operation to biotechnology), that has the capacity to work with regional and extra-regional players like the EU, ASEAN, South Korea and New Zealand.

This grants it wider acceptability and global leadership potential. Nonetheless, the debate on the actual purpose and further development of the Quad remains lively, as analysts argue that the lowest common denominator of the four partners’ interests is still relatively low - to limit China’s influence and to strengthen their own status and influence in the region. Hence, as Manoj Kewalramani points out here, there is no doubt that Quad needs a more outcomes-focused approach.

Below, I delineate a few key debates for and against the QUAD.

The first debate concerns the Quad’s security arrangement. Some argue that it is perhaps the epitome of a weak security arrangement. The Quad does not have a mutual defence pact, any collective defence commitment or a joint command and control system. Individual countries have diverse strategic priorities, with India’s focus on border disputes with China and Pakistan and Japan’s focus on East China Sea, Taiwan and the North Korean threat. This understandably runs the risk of each country engaging in fragmented and uncoordinated actions and eschewing a cohesive multilateral approach endorsed by all partner countries.

Here, it is important to note that Quad’s primary focus is strategic cooperation, and not necessarily collective defence. It emphasises on the provision of public goods (like the Open Radio Access Network), along with the broader security  concerns of the four members. The Quad countries conduct joint naval exercises together in the form of the Malabar drills and also at the bilateral level. Similarly, there is deep cooperation on issues like intelligence sharing, domain awareness, countering terrorism and a range of non-traditional security areas. The Quad is a new type of formation aimed at addressing modern-day security threats. It would be a misreading to assess it through the frame of a traditional alliance lens.

The second debate surrounds its limited economic cooperation. Quad members enjoy strong bilateral economic ties but there is no comprehensive free trade agreement that involves all four. Further, they all continue to have significant trade dependence on China, which will likely prevent them from taking strong collective actions without risking economic repercussions. China is a major trading partner for all Quad members, making them inextricably reliant on Chinese supply chains.

However, the Quad undertakes specific economic initiatives. It is not a grouping that is aimed at boosting trade among members. It is essentially a special purpose vehicle that seeks to address pressing issues around economic vulnerabilities and building capacity and resilience when it comes to future industries. While recognising their dependence on China, the Quad engages in initiatives such as augmenting supply chain resilience, infrastructure development, and digital connectivity etc.

Another common argument against the Quad is that it lacks an institutional framework. The forum does not have a permanent secretariat nor any binding agreements that enforce policies and regulations. This lack of formalisation can increase difficulty in coordination and implementation of comprehensive strategies. It also raises concerns around sustainability​. In contrast, the informal nature of Quad is by design. It allows it flexibility in operations and agenda, helping the members collaborate on a range of issues without the obligations of a formal treaty. This loose structure is therefore, an advantage, allowing the Quad to adapt to changing geopolitical dynamics and regional challenges.

Just as formalisation does not ensure greater effectiveness, the lack of it does not necessarily imply the contrary. For example, we can look at BIMSTEC: despite having a secretariat and a charter, it suffers from inaction and resource constraints. On the other hand, the G20, despite being an informal grouping, has been constructive in addressing global economic issues.

The Quad must be mindful to not get mired in bureaucratic challenges that hinder its ability to respond swiftly. Nor must it get distracted by competing agendas. For example, creating unnecessary economic structures like banks will only lead to duplication of efforts. Instead, the Quad can continue collaborating in sectors where they enjoy a high degree of interoperability.

Finally, critics may argue that the Quad has a limited scope and impact compared to other regional organisations like ASEAN. Its focus on security and select public goods might overshadow other important areas such as trade, environmental and humanitarian issues, which are crucial for development and integration. However, the Quad has several multi-sectoral partnerships collaborating in areas such as health security, disaster response and humanitarian assistance and clean energy. They also work together on new and emerging domains, such as cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and critical infrastructure protection along with capacity building and information exchange. 

The Asian Development Bank has calculated that developing Asia will need to invest $1.7 trillion annually through 2030 to achieve its economic ambitions. It estimates that government reforms could bridge up to 40% of the infrastructure gap, but the private sector will be essential to mobilising the rest of the needed funds. The challenge for the Quad now is how best to coordinate investment between government and the private sector, and then coordinate that investment across the Indo-Pacific.

Moreover, the Quad’s loose structure allows it to work with other mini-laterals like IPEF (Indo Pacific Economic Framework) and the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Prosperity (IP3) that was launched earlier this year. The IPEF has been called a “Quad-plus entity” which is a display of the diplomatic maturity of Quad members, inviting more countries and living up to the notion of a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific.